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practicing as criminal defense lawyers 
for both LAS or the city's assigned 
counsel plan. 
The threats worked. The union 
ended the strike and the lawyers quick- 
ly returned to court. The mayor, how- 
ever, was not satisfied. He took action 
to ensure that he would never again 
depend so heavily upon a single union- 
ized provider of criminal defense ser- 
vices. The next year, he dramatically 
reduced the size of LAS's city contract, 
forcing the layoff of dozens i f  experi- 
enced lawyers and drastically reducing 
Sets Standards training and supervision for the staff. ~t 
the same time, he issued a request for 
proposals (RFP) soliciting potential P u b 1 i c D e f e n s e providers of criminal defense services in each borough. The RFP invited new 
for fndigent 
- 
organizations to represent 12,500 indi- 
gent individuals in Manhattan and 
10,000 in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and 
Queens. In Staten Island the new Defense provider would completely replace 
LAS. Two new appeals offices would 
each represent 250 clients. For the 
Plroviders fust time LAS faced competition. The 
organized bar, meanwhile, reacted 
with alarm. 
The local bar associations were 
By Adele Bern hard aware that New York City was not the first jurisdiction to experiment with 
R eacting to a strike by The Legal Aid Society's criminal defense staff in 1994, New York City 
began a search for alternate defender 
organizations to break what government 
officials saw as a lnonopoly on the 
delivery of indigent defense services. 
Concerned that the city would solicit 
with the narrow goal of cost contain- 
ment rather than providing quality ser- 
vices, the New York Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, First Department, 
at the urging of local bar associations, 
created an eight-member oversight 
committee of lawyers to monitor the 
effects of the decision to contract with 
multiple providers. As more local and 
state governments nationwide turn to 
competitive contracts for criminal indi- 
gent defense services, the experiences 
of New York City's private bar initia- 
tive may prove useful for other jurisdic- 
tions attempting to set standards and 
goals to ensure quality services and 
protect criminal defense services from 
political and fiscal pressures. 
The confrontation between The 
Legal Aid Society (LAS) and the city 
began when the Association of Legal 
Aid Attorneys, the LAS lawyers' union, 
voted to strike over low wages and a 15 
percent increase in individual case- 
loads. In a city where close to 900 indi- 
viduals are arrested and detained each 
day, and where each of those persons 
must be represented by counsel in order 
to be arraigned, a strike by defense 
providers can disrupt the courts and jam 
arrest processing. The strike incensed 
city government officials and the 
mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, who threat- 
ened to terminate The Legal Aid 
Society's long-standing contract with 
the city and to withhold payments due. 
He also demanded a $16 million dollar 
retroactive cut in the LAS budget. 
Finally, he told striking lawyers that 
defense services contracts, which are 
becoming increasingly popular. The 
most recent survey by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics reports that no con- 
tracts for defense services existed in 
1972; however, by 1986, contracts were 
in use in 6 percent of all counties 
nationwide and 14 percent of all coun- 
ties with a population of one million or 
more. Ten years later it is likely that 
those numbers have grown exponential- 
ly. But as contracts proliferate, they 
have been criticized by courts, the acad- 
emic community, and the American Bar 
Association. 
Fixed-price contracts are the most 
worrisome. In a fixed-price contract, a 
lawyer or group of lawyers agrees to 
handle all assignments in a given juris- 
diction over a set period of time for a 
set price. Such a scheme is attractive to 
states and local governments concerned 
with containing costs and accurately 
predicting expenditures, but fixed-price 
contracts risk reducing quality of 
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services, especially when 
connacts are awarded 
through competitive bidding. 
Further, contract organiza- 
tions risk jeopardizing their 
professional independence as 
allegiances gravitate towards 
funding sources rather than 
clients. 
Recognizing the potential 
for problems, the ABA 
Standards for Criminal 
Justdce: Providing Defense 
Services warn that contracts 
should not be awarded "pri- 
marily on the basis of cost" 
and suggest that contracts for 
services include terms and 
conditions designed to ensure 
quality representation and 
professional independence. 
Robert Spangenberg, an 
expert consultant in criminal 
justice and defense services, 
opposes the use of the fixed- 
price contracts, preferring 
agreements that bind the con- 
tractor to representing only a 
fixed number of clients or 
cases for a set price. 
Although such an arrange- 
ment is no guarantee against 
the risk that cases will turn 
out to be complex, requiring 
more lawyer and expert hours 
than anticipated, it does 
afford more protection than 
an open-ended contract that 
forces an organization to handle all 
arrests and resulting prosecutions within 
its jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many 
contractors across the county have 
agreed to fixed-price, open-ended con- 
tracts. In fact, as the bar associations 
were later to discover, this is exactly the 
predicament in which LAS now found 
itself. 
Concerned that the city would pick 
the cheapest, most efficient defense 
provider rather than the best-equipped 
and most dedicated to delivering quality 
services, the New York County 
Lawyers' Association, joined by the 
Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York and the Bronx Bar 
Association, first approached the city to 
establish an oversight mechanism. 
When the city declined, the associations 
drafted rules for the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, First 
Department, to establish an oversight 
committee responsible for shielding the 
quality of defense services from cost- 
driven politics. The rules enacted as 
Part 603 of the Supreme Court, 
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Appellate Division, First Department 
Court Rules create an eight-member 
Indigent Defense Organization 
Oversight Committee with the 
authority and responsibility to monitor 
the provision of all defense services in 
the First Department-the Bronx and 
Manhattan -and to consider all mat- 
ters pertaining to the performance and 
professional conduct of such organiza- 
tions and the individual attorneys in 
their employ. 
Recognizing that an honest evalua- 
tion of defense services would be con- 
troversial, difficult to accomplish, and 
potentially open to misinterpretation by 
political adversaries, the oversight com- 
mittee began its supervisory task cau- 
tiously. Public defense systems, 
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whether public defenders, contract 
offices, or private bar plans, have been 
virtually exempt from public scrutiny 
despite the burgeoning numbers of 
defense offices and the growing cadre 
of private lawyers who provide defense 
services at public expense. Criticism of 
defense services has focused generally 
on the performance of individual attor- 
neys on individual cases. Even the 
comprehensive McConville and Mirsky 
report, Criminal Defense of the Poor in 
New York City, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change 581 (1986-87), which 
criticized the work of all the city's 
defenders, failed to suggest how the 
organizations might help staff improve 
performance. Studies of public defense 
systems concentrate on hnding, with 
failures and shortcomings attributed to 
Spring 1998 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
lack of financial support. Written by 
defense consultants in order to generate 
more funding or by death penalty aboli- 
tionists whose insights can be lost in 
the fray over the sanction, conclusions 
lack objectivity and have failed to cap- 
ture the public's interest. Whether the 
public does not believe the diagnosis or 
is simply unconcerned about the quality 
of services, no one pays a great deal of 
attention to how well a public defense 
organization works. 
The courts, too, rarely comment. 
Members of the bench seldom pastici- 
pate in efforts to monitor attorney per- 
formance (apart from Rule 11 sanctions 
in the federal system) and only overturn 
convictions when the quality of repre- 
sentation sinks to the level of constitu- 
tional "ineffectiveness"-a standard 
incentive. 
The committee debated whether its 
monitoring might help the defender orga- 
nizations to improve funding and remind 
fivnding sources of the importance of 
investing in defense services. The com- 
mittee also considered what a public 
defender office could do to motivate a 
young and idealist staff, such as training, 
supervision, and evaluation, in addition 
to better promotional opportunities and a 
chance at recognition. 
Standards and guidelines 
With all these considerations in mind, the 
oversight committee drafted standards and 
guidelines with the primary goal of creating a 
yardstick for defense services organizations 
against which to measm performance and 
the hope that a practical set of standards serve 
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multiple purposes, including: and what kind of supervision should be 
educating a skeptical public about what it available; and where the caseload limits 
takes to provide quality defense services; ought to be set for felonies, misdemeanors, 
promoting an understanding of why ade- and appeals. 
quate funding is necessary (to engender The committee's starting point was the 
public support for more spending); and ABA Standad for Criminal Justice: PE)- 
providing notice to the organizations viding Defewe Senlices (third edition), 
themselves of what is expected of a pub- drafted by the Criminal  ust tie standards 
licly funded defense office. Committee of the Criminal Justice Section 
National and local bar associations have and approved with commenw in 1992, 
drafted several standards relevant to the Also useful was the NLADA's Gui&lines 
task of providing criminal defense services. for Negotiating &Awarding Governmen- 
Most assigned counsel plans, for example, tal Contracts for Criminal Defense Ser- 
have qualification standards for screening vices, adopted in 1984, as well as standacds 
lawyers in criminal defense cases. Those developed by state public defender com- 
missions in Washing- 
ton, Maqsachusetts, 
and Indiana. Each set 
Without monitoring and was intended to assist defense organiza- 
consequences, standards have tions in obtaining funding, and every 
little bite. set contained useful 
ideas. Overall, how- 
ever, the existing 
standard5 employed 
standards concentmte on a lawyer's qualifi- broad, general language, ill-suited for the 
cations and experience. The ABA and the purposes of monitoring the defense system. 
National Legal Aid and Defender Associa- The ABA standards, for example, require 
tion (NLADA) have each adopted perfor- "reasonable compensation levels (Standard 
mance standards for prosecutors and de- 5-3.2) . . . a policy for handling conflicts of 
fense attorneys that focus on an individual interest cases (Standard 5-3.3(vii) . . . 
lawyer's responsibilities when representing workload limits for individual lawyers (v) . 
an individual client. Those standards em- . . supervision, evaluation, training, and 
phasize what tasks (e.g., motion practice, professional development (xi) . . . a system 
investigation, plea bargaining, or sentenc- of case management and reporting (xiv). " 
ing advocacy) ought to be conducted on none provided answers to two major 
any individual case. But the committee's questions: Who monitors the contract 
approach was organiaational, not individ- providers for compliance? And, what sanc- 
ual. The cornnittee was less interested in tions are imposed if the providers are found 
attorney qualifications than in how a de- not to be in compliance? 
fender office ensures that its lawyers are 
qualified; less interested in defining effec- Creating a yardstick 
tive advocacy than in how a defender of- The committee realized that its eight 
fice enssures that its staff performed zeal- volunteer members would be responsible 
ously. The committee's goal was to not just for defining how organizations 
establish minimum protocols for hiring, ought to assist lawyers, but also for on-site 
training, supervising, supporting, and eval- inspections to venfy whether the organiza- 
uating 1awye-e practicalities of run- tions really provided the support they 
ning an office. These types of standards claimed. Detailed standards would be easi- 
were rare indeed. er to use than vague pronouncements open 
Based on existing standards and the ex- to multiple interpreutions. A standard sim- 
perience of committee members and other ply requiring 'Wning" isn't much help 
defenders, the committee determined what when it comes time to inspect an organiza- 
the lawyer/investigator ratio should be; tion. The organization might claim that its 
how much training and continuing legal one-week introductory course satisfies a 
education should be provided; how much ''training requirement, while the inspec- 
tion team might determine that "training" 
requires on going continuing legal educa- 
tion. An organization might believe that 
hiring a single investigator satisfies a stan- 
dad that requires "sufficient investigatory 
staff" while the review committee might 
have quite a different idea. Thus, in drafting 
the standards, specifics were included 
where possible, without any particular or- 
ganization in mind, to give the organiza- 
tions clear notice of expectations and to re- 
duce post monitoring debates. 
The oversight committee's performance 
standards, entitled General Requirements 
for All Organized Providers o f  Defense 
Services to Indigent Defidmts, is divided 
into 10 sections: professional indepen- 
dence; qualitications of lawyers; training; 
supervision; workloads, evaluation, promo- 
tion, and discipline; support services; case 
management and quality control; compli- 
ance with standards of professional respon- 
sibility; and reporting obligations. Each 
section is divided into three paas: perfor- 
mance standard%, evaluation criteria, and a 
commentary. [For details, see sidebar "Per- 
formance Standards."] 
Failure to meet the specific guidelines 
would not necessarily mandate a finding 
that the organization is not providing quali- 
ty representation, but the busden to explain 
how it was accomplishing the goal would 
be on the organization. "In such cases, the 
defense organization must demonstrate that 
it has adopted equivalent practices and pro- 
cedures suitable to its particular structure 
and method of operation to ensure adher- 
ence to each of the Performance Standards." 
Before finalizing the standards, the 
oversight committee solicited comments 
from interested defender organizations, in- 
cluding those that would be evaluated on 
the basis of compliance with the standards. 
Most of the standards were accepted with- 
out discussion. One area that generated 
controversy was the workload/caseload 
standard. The Legal Aid Society, in particu- 
lar, thought that the committee's decision to 
count cases at the point of intake-arraign- 
ments---would result in its lawyers' case- 
loads exceeding the standard. LAS argued 
that cases should be counted post arraign- 
ment, pointing out that many matters are 
disposed of at the first stage of a criminal 
proceeding, and arguing that pending post 
intake cases should be the only ones count- 
ed as a measure of workload. The commit- 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Spring 1998 
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tre considered this argument, but being un- 
sure whether nlore cases are disposed of at 
intake Ncw York City than in other major 
cities, mcrnbec; declin~vi to adopt nu~nbem 
that dBered from the nationally accepted 
workload standards. 
Monitoring 
Compliance inspections and rebuttable 
presumptions were also co~ltei~tious. Robert 
Spangenbesg wrote that "the monitoring of 
tltese standards would ~zsult in a system of 
ameditation or cestitication, which does not 
exist in any indigent defense system in the 
country." He warned that such a system has 
serious prohlems because it doesn't take 
"'into account available resources . . . ; the 
rigidity of certification standards would not 
leave room for innovative approaches that 
public defenders are taking tc>wards im- 
proved representation; and . . . the monitor- 
ing of performance standards requires a 
substantial staff of both attorneys and non- 
attorneys." 
But without monitoring and the possibili- 
ty of ramifications based on observable find- 
ings, the st'andards would have little bite. 
There seemed little purpose in drafting an- 
other set of goals that could be breached 
without regard for consequellces. The over- 
sight committee wanted to establish a work- 
able and practical list of minimum rquire- 
ments, which if not achieved would signify 
that the organization could not be certified 
as providing quality seprese~~tation. The 
comniittee decided that the difficulty of the 
task was not an argument for refusing to 
begin, and because the presumption was re- 
buttable, not conclusive, the general require- 
ments would be flexible enough to permit 
innovation. 
Once the standards were pro~z~ulgated on
July 1, 1996, the co~nmittee began its moni- 
toring work. Although New York had not 
yet cc)nh-dctcd with any new organizations to 
provide defense services in the First Depcut- 
ment, existing providers were within the 
oversight committee's sphere of recpcnsibil- 
jty. They included The Legal Aid Society 
(which has sepmdte trial offces in the Bm11x 
and Manhattan and an appellate unit), the 
OEce ofthe Appellate Defender (a small 
office providing repuesentation on crirnind 
appeals), and the Neighborhood Defender 
Service of Harlem (a trial office that was 
started by the VERA Institute of Justice as a 
demonstration project). 
Fist, the oversight committee asked 
each oqpnization to submit written docu- 
mentation of its compliance with the gener- 
al requirements by responding to a ques- 
tionnak requesting speciiic information. 
Answers could be supplemented with any 
relevant material. [See sidebar "Question- 
naire on Qualifications."J 
After receiving the organizations' sub- 
missions, inembers of the committee, ac- 
conlpanied hy additional volunteers from 
the t h e  participating bar associations, vis- 
ited the three defense organization offices 
and interviewed a number of the personnel 
to verify the written information. In other 
words, if an organization claimed to pro- 
vide continuing legal education (CLE), the 
inspection team looked to see what was ac- 
tually provided. Teams asked the lawyers 
not simply whether CLE was available, but 
whether it was available at a time they 
could attend and whether the offerings 
werx useful to their practice. Thus, the in- 
spections were both in-depth and extensive. 
Committee mcmbers met, for example, 
every member of the staff of the Office d 
the Appellate Defender and 29 lawyers 
with the Manhattan oftice of the LAS crim- 
inal defcnse division. 
Teams met with clerks, data input spe- 
cialists, social workers, investigators, ad- 
ministrators, supervisors, and staff kawyers 
in an effort to question each about all the 
areas covered by the standards. To a much 
lesser extent, the committee interviewed 
judges, criminal defense practitioners, aild 
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others familiar with the activities of the 
three organizations. After the interviews 
were completed, each team distilled the re- 
sults into a subcommittee r e m  from 
which, along with the organizations"t- 
ten submissions, the oversight committee 
drafted a h t  annual report. 
Can quality survive in NYC? 
The report found that "as of the fall of 
1996, each of the three defense organiza- 
tions provides quality repl-esentation gener- 
ally meeting the Standards." It noted, how- 
ever, that there we15 certain substantid 
problems that, if not corrected, would com- 
promise the quality of services provided in 
New York City. The most troublesome 
finding was that The Legal Aid Society's 
cawload far exceeded the numbers desig- 
nated in the committee's general require- 
ments and specific guidelines, presump- 
tively violating Performance Standard V, 
which requires lawyers "to maintain man- 
ageable workloads in order to permit them 
to render quality representation to each in- 
dividual client." Because the committee 
had questions about the propriety of apply- 
ing the nationally accepted caseload num- 
bers to New York City defense organiza- 
tions, and its intent in this initial monitoring 
was not to punish any organization but to 
assist it to improve the quality of represen- 
tation, the committee decided: 
Legal Aid's contractual arrangements 
with the City require it to represent all 
indigent persons arrested (except con- 
flict cases) for whom other arrange- 
ments are not available. Because the 
City's current anticrime efforts include 
making a rising number of arrests, Legal 
Aid is required to handle an ever in- 
creasing number of cases with a reduced 
budget and staff. As a result, both New 
York and Bronx O D s '  workloads 
greatly exceeded the Oversight Com- 
mittee's Guidelines. lTf that situation 
continues] the Committee is concerned 
that the quality of Legal Aid's represen- 
tation will necessarily continue to be 
eroded. 
In the absence of some conb-actual 
m t y  of acceptable caseload limits 
or fiscal provision for increasing case- 
loads, there does not appear to be any 
assurance that Legal Aid can meet the 
Oversight Committee's workload guide- 
lines in the future. The current arrange- 
ment is likely to result in a reduction of 
quality representation. 
The committee found that LAS's failure 
to establish and comply with caseload lim- 
ib  was adversely affecting staff morale and 
delivery of services. This problem, identi- 
fied as early as 197 1 by the Appellate Divi- 
sion Committee, must now be resolved, In 
an attempt to remain the primary defender 
in New York City, LAS had agreed to rep 
resent all indigent criminal clients (an ex- 
panding clientele) for a single, fixed price, 
which put it in an untenable position. The 
struggle to provide services in court with 
fewer lawyers and a smaller budget is in- 
evitably impinging upon training and su- 
pervision. Regarding supervision, the over- 
sight committee found: 
In addition to its caseload levels, at 
Legal Aid's New York CDD, the ratio of 
supervisors to staff does not meet the 
Oversight Committee's S@c Cuide- 
line. As Legal Aid staff lawyers struggle 
to cope with larger workloads, the ade- 
quacy of supervision becomes ever 
more important. Legal Aid has tried to 
compensate for the s h q  reduction in 
numbers of supervisors at both the trial 
and appellate levels by employing new 
training methods, oversight and review 
of staff lawyen' work product. Never- 
theless, particularly at New York CDD, 
there has been a noticeable diminution 
of in-court supervision which, if allowed 
to continue, will adversely affect quality. 
Finally? the standards highlighted trends 
cutting across the New York City criminal 
justice system: 
As the City's anti-crime efforts pour 
thousands of additional misdemeanor 
cases into the system, Legal Aid risks 
evolving into a misdemeanor defense 
organization. The City's contracts with 
alternate offices for portions of the de- 
fense work in the Second Department, 
and its 1996 RFP to handle cases not 
being handled by Legal Aid in New 
York and Bronx Counties, require that 
the contracting organizations hire only 
lawyers qualified to handle felonies. 
Thus, new lawyer training in criminal 
defense work is likely to depend even 
more in the future on the efforts of 
Legal Aid, which will be employing dl 
new, inexperienced lawyers, and p v i d -  
ing misdemeanor representation and 
training for the criminal defense bar. Ac- 
cordingly for the long term future, it is 
important that the training functions of 
Legal Aid be maintained and enhanced. 
Since the committee's initial report, New 
York City has negotiated contracts with 
three new defense organizations in the First 
Department, bringing to seven the number 
of new defense providers in the city. The 
Bronx Defenders and the New York County 
Defender Services began accepting trial 
court assignments in September 1997. The 
Center for Appellate Litigation is handling 
appeals. As anticipated, the city reduced 
Legal Aid Society's budget to fund these 
new offices. It is still too early to anticipate 
whether the young organizations will be 
funded at a level sufficient to meet the over- 
sight committee's general requirements or 
whether the cuts to LAS's budget will render 
it incapable of reducing caseloads. The com- 
mittee will begin its second round of moni- 
toring-focusing on the new institutions- 
this spring, issuing a report in late 1998. 
Hopefully, the standards have made the 
public as well as those in city government 
aware of the complexity of providing quality 
services, stimulating service providers to 
better support staff with training, supervi- 
sion, and case management tools. 
But what happens if the organized de- 
fense providers fail to meet the standards? 
Because the oversight committee is an ac- 
crediting body of the appellate division, it is 
likely the appellate division would instruct 
its trial judiciary to refrain from assigning 
cases to employees of "de-cert%ed" organi- 
zations-in effect, preventing the new 
organizations from handling any cases, 
despite their contract with the city. Such a 
face-off would certainly result in litigation. 
Meanwhile, the work of the Indigent 
Defense Organization Oversight Committee 
proves that practical standards can be drak- 
ed, and that armed with standards, even a 
small w d t t e e  of volunteer lawyers can 
evaluate criminal defense services. The next 
step is to insist during funding negotiations 
that are taking place in New York City and 
across the country that the defender offices 
are provided with the support and resources 
they need to meet the standards, practice 
competently, and represent their clients.  
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